Customer Preferences and Opaque Intermediaries by Xie, Xiaoqing (Kristine) et al.
Cornell University School of Hotel Administration
The Scholarly Commons
Articles and Chapters School of Hotel Administration Collection
1-6-2017
Customer Preferences and Opaque Intermediaries
Xiaoqing (Kristine) Xie
China Europe International Business School
Chris K. Anderson
Cornell University School of Hotel Administration, cka9@cornell.edu
Rohit Verma
Cornell University, rv54@cornell.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.sha.cornell.edu/articles
Part of the Hospitality Administration and Management Commons, and the Tourism and Travel
Commons
This Article or Chapter is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Hotel Administration Collection at The Scholarly Commons. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Articles and Chapters by an authorized administrator of The Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
hlmdigital@cornell.edu.
Recommended Citation
Xie, X., Anderson, C. K., & Verma, R. (2017). Customer preferences and opaque intermediaries. Cornell Hospitality Quarterly, doi:
10.1177/1938965516686108.
Customer Preferences and Opaque Intermediaries
Abstract
Using two choice-based experiments, we evaluate consumer preferences hotel attributes for firms selling hotel
rooms across three online distribution channel formats: full information, semi-opaque, and opaque online
travel agents. A multinomial logit model is used to analyze the experimental data and measure consumer
trade-offs between price and other product attributes. We then use these preferences to determine optimal
channel selling strategies. Our optimal channel strategies illustrate under what conditions firms should add
opaque distribution channels and the resulting incremental revenue obtained with the setting of optimal
channel specific prices. We deploy two choice-based experiments, traditional and menu-based, in an effort to
add flexibility to survey respondents in choice selection. As part of our analysis, we compare managerial
insights from analysis based on traditional choice-based experiments to that using menu-based choice
experiments. In general, we indicate that both forms of opaque selling increase firm demand and that with
appropriate pricing can also increase firm revenue. In addition, opaque channels have elevated price sensitivity
and increased impact of guest reviews versus traditional online travel agents.
Keywords
online choice experiment, opaque selling, the MNL model, buyer behavior
Disciplines
Hospitality Administration and Management | Tourism and Travel
Comments
Required Publisher Statement
© Cornell University. Reprinted with permission. All rights reserved.
This article or chapter is available at The Scholarly Commons: http://scholarship.sha.cornell.edu/articles/1039
https://doi.org/10.1177/1938965516686108
Cornell Hospitality Quarterly
 1 –12
© The Author(s) 2017
Reprints and permissions: 
sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav
DOI  10.1177/193896551 686108
journals.sagepub.com/home/cqx
Article
Introduction
The selling of services (rooms, rental cars, airline seats, etc.) 
online has dramatically changed how service firms reach 
customers, with online travel sales now exceeding offline 
(or traditional sales channels). Although adding online sell-
ing channels should provide firms an opportunity to expand 
the market and achieve a finer level consumer segmentation, 
there exists very little empirical research evaluating the 
impacts of additional online sales channels upon firm reve-
nue. To this end, we use an online choice experiment to 
assess the revenue impacts of a firm adopting a multichannel 
selling strategy whereby the channels differ in the level of 
product information provided to the consumer. We use 
online hotel booking as an illustration as hotels have 
deployed online channel strategies for almost 20 years. The 
online distribution channels we investigate include a regular 
full information online travel agent (OTA), such as Expedia, 
Orbitz, or Travelocity; a fully opaque channel like Priceline’s 
name-your-own-price (NYOP) model; and less opaque 
channels which we term semi-opaque or opaque posted 
price channel like Hotwire or Lastminute. Semi-opaque and 
opaque channels, unlike regular full information OTAs, 
offer customers products or services with aspects of the ser-
vice provider concealed until the transaction has been com-
pleted requiring consumers to make price-information 
trade-offs. Opaque selling is common across all facets of 
travel; with air travel, the consumer is unaware of the itiner-
ary (connections and layover durations) or airline and with 
rental cars, the consumer does not know the type of car or 
rental firm until after paying for the service. The level of 
opacity or uncertainty varies across the different opaque 
channels as some choose to offer cancelation opportunities 
as in the case of Lastminute.com, provide user generated 
feedback (review scores), or list some of the hotel amenities 
as in the case of Hotwire.com. Similarly the degree of opac-
ity may also be impacted by the market, as markets with 
fewer similar competitors offer decreased opacity over mar-
kets with a large number of similar service providers. 
Opaque selling has been deployed as a business practice for 
almost 20 years with the launch of Priceline’s NYOP in 1997 
followed shortly by Hotwire’s posted price format in 2000, 
but research on opaque selling is relatively new. In the fol-
lowing, we highlight aspects of opaque selling but focus 
largely on the opaque selling literature which we build upon. 
In addition to the opaque selling literature, we briefly mention 
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the experimental choice literature relevant to our method-
ological contributions.
Simultaneously Selling on Both Opaque and 
Regular Channels
There are two main forms of opaque selling—opaque sell-
ing with bidding pioneered by Priceline’s NYOP model and 
semi-opaque selling or opaque selling with posted prices. 
Anderson (2009) provides a detailed description of 
Priceline’s NYOP model and illustrates methods for deter-
mining optimal bid policies on Priceline. Whereas Anderson 
and Xie (2012) provide background into Hotwire’s semi-
opaque posted price model as part of their development of 
optimal prices for firms deploying Hotwire as a selling 
format.
Early opaque selling research has been analytical in 
nature with attempts to theoretically justify the use of 
opaque selling (alongside full information selling). Fay 
(2008) uses a traditional hotelling model to study a game 
between two service providers selling products to two types 
of customers (loyals and searchers) on both an opaque 
posted price channel and a traditional distribution channel. 
Fay shows that opaque selling benefits the monopoly ser-
vice provider when customers have heterogeneous values 
for products. Shapiro and Shi (2008) extend the model of 
Fay (2008) to N firms with the number of firms indicating 
the degree of opacity–uncertainty in knowledge of service 
provider increases with number of firms. Shapiro and Shi 
focus on providing a rational for opaque selling. In essence, 
these papers illustrate (analytically) why service providers 
are willing to distribute products through opaque travel 
sites such as Priceline and Hotwire.
Similar to our article, Shapiro and Zillante (2009) imple-
ment an experimental approach to exam the impacts of 
opaque and full information selling. While we look at 
posted opaque prices in concert with opaque bidding (in 
addition to full information), Shapiro and Zillante focus 
only on opaque bidding and full information selling. Shapiro 
and Zillante also aim to study the properties of NYOP 
mechanism and especially whether NYOP websites such as 
Priceline should use the opaque feature. Similar to our 
results, they show adding a NYOP selling mechanism with 
the opaque feature to the regular selling channel will 
decrease the seller profit when the bidding threshold (i.e., 
the “price” on bidding channel) is set too low. Granados, 
Gupta, and Kauffman (2008) use sales data from an OTA to 
estimate elasticity differences between transparent and 
opaque selling of airline tickets. Using aggregated transac-
tional data, they indicate the opaque products are more elas-
tic than transparent tickets. As they use aggregate level data, 
they exclude numerous critical attributes of airline tickets 
including carriers, trip duration, stops, and so on, all fea-
tures which one would consider critical in differentiating 
opaque versus transparent (or full information) selling. 
Similar to Shapiro and Zillante (2009), Granados et al. 
(2008) do not differentiate opaque posted price selling from 
opaque bidding. In a follow-on paper, Granados, Gupta, and 
Kauffman (2012) add additional transactional data from tra-
ditional (offline) travel agents to their sample, they find that 
sales are less elastic at traditional agents, in fact sales at 
traditional travel agents they find to be more inelastic than 
sales at transparent OTAs and opaque OTAs more elastic 
than transparent OTAs. Similar to their 2008 paper, the 
results are for aggregated sales data and may not be reflec-
tive of true demand as the data excludes nonpurchase 
events, product attributes and sales through other channels 
(airline direct, wholesale, etc.).
So while research on opaque selling has over a 10-year 
history, very few papers actually fully investigate all aspects 
of opaque and full information selling, in fact Anderson and 
Xie (2014) is the only paper that investigates a firm using 
two opaque (posted prices and bidding) channels simultane-
ously with regular full information posted price channels. 
Anderson and Xie (2014) develop endogenous consumer 
segments where consumers choose the channel of their 
choice by maximizing their surplus (utility) using a stylized 
model of consumer behavior. Then, based on this exoge-
nous channel choices, Anderson and Xie develop optimal 
channel prices and illustrate revenue impacts from opaque 
selling owing to consumer segmentation.
We extend this earlier research in numerous ways; first, 
we empirically assess the analytical insights of Anderson 
and Xie (2014) as well as extend the results of Shapiro and 
Zillante (2009) and those of Granados et al. (2008, 2012) by 
differentiating opaque posted prices from opaque bidding in 
addition to selling via transparent or full information sell-
ing. In addition, most of this prior research has been set in 
the airline industry. The airline industry tends to be much 
more commoditized (less differentiated than hotels) and as 
such we would expect the impacts of opaque selling to be 
different from that of a highly differentiated industry like 
hotels. In addition, our methodology, discrete choice exper-
imental analysis, as opposed to the aggregated market 
response model used in Granados et al. (2008, 2012) allows 
estimation of the impacts of product attributes as well as 
true demand given we have a no-purchase option. In the 
following section, we provide some further background 
into our experimental methods.
Experimental Choice Analysis
In the past four decades, conjoint analysis has become the 
most widely applied method for measuring and analyzing 
consumer behavior and preferences. Experimental choice 
analysis, is a natural extension to conjoint analysis. Louviere 
(1992) offers a review on the state of art in experimental 
choice analysis. Traditional experimental choice analysis 
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allows users to select among a set of alternatives each with 
potentially different levels across a set of attributes. 
Traditional choice analysis fails to capture the flexibility in 
today’s world of mass customization where consumers are 
often allowed to customize their purchase by both attributes 
and levels. Liechty, Ramaswamy, and Cohen (2001) pro-
pose subtle changes to the traditional choice experiment 
where respondents customize their choices versus simply 
select from a series of options. Like a traditional choice 
experiment, respondents select among levels of attributes 
across features but in addition there exists a set of feature 
menus that users select from. Attractiveness or sensitivity of 
features is estimated as respondents see differing menus of 
features with different available levels of the attributes. 
More recent menu-based approaches to choice experiments 
have dealt with solving some of the methodological issues 
associated with menu-based designed as measurement 
needs to either assume that attributes are independent of the 
features available or suffer from the curse of dimensionality 
if all the potential interactions created by partial availability 
of features during the experiment (see Kamakura & Kwak, 
2010, for a recent review and discussion of menu-choice 
modeling). Here, we contribute to the experimental choice 
literature by utilizing two experimental approaches, tradi-
tional choice experiments and menu-based. We compare 
parameter estimates under both frameworks but more 
importantly we compare firm decisions and revenue impacts 
that results under use of models estimated under the two 
choice settings.
To evaluate the revenue impacts of a multichannel 
strategy, we deploy online choice-based experiments. We 
use two survey formats: a traditional experimental choice 
survey, and a second a menu variant to add flexibility to 
the consumer choice process allowing us to contrast mana-
gerial insights under the two survey formats. A multino-
mial logit (MNL) model is used to assess the impacts of 
channel and hotel attributes (such as price, star rating, pre-
vious guest rating, etc.) upon purchase behavior. We then 
use hotel and channel attributes to illustrate optimal chan-
nel prices and the resulting incremental revenues. Our 
article makes contributions on two fronts: To our knowl-
edge, ours is the only article that empirically quantifies 
consumer trade-offs across the three major forms of online 
selling in hospitality and then uses this to determine the 
incremental revenue created by multichannel use. Hotels 
can then use our insights to decide whether they should 
adopt an opaque selling strategy or whether the current 
channel prices (in combination with their attributes) indi-
cate that opaque selling would not result in incremental 
revenue. As part of this quantification, we provide addi-
tional insight into how attributes such as star level, price, 
and review scores differ in their impact as a function of the 
opacity of the sales channel providing further direction for 
how firms might capitalize on opaque selling formats. 
Secondarily, we contribute to the experimental discrete 
choice analysis literature as we contrast insights generated 
from the use of traditional choice-based experiments to 
those of menu-based choice experiments indicating that 
small changes in survey format can result in substantive 
changes in managerial insight.
Data Collection and Experimental 
Design
Respondents were presented with three hotel-channel 
options along with a no-purchase option. Each respondent, 
in addition to the no-purchase option, sees three listings: a 
regular full information listing similar to what one would 
see at an OTA or suppliers website, a posted price opaque 
travel site, and an opaque bidding travel site (subsequently 
referred to as REG, OPQ, and BID, respectively). Prior to 
seeing the choice scenarios, respondents are asked to read 
educational information about the three forms of online 
selling.
Alternative Attributes
Respondents were shown 10 choice scenarios (each with 
the four options). A sample set of choice scenarios is shown 
in Figure 1 with attributes and levels summarized in Table 1. 
To clearly communicate the differences in hotel-channel 
options on the online questionnaire, we label the options 
“Full Information,” “Partial Information,” and “Partial 
Information With Bidding” (representing REG, OPQ, and 
BID, respectively).
During the early stages, respondents are asked to select 
from a list any hotel loyalty programs to which they belong 
so that during the experiment, they are shown hotels (in the 
full information listing) both within and outside those pro-
grams in an effort to evaluate the impact of loyalty pro-
grams upon purchase and channel choice. The REG hotel 
listing has three additional attributes. The star rating of the 
hotel is varied among three levels 3, 3½, and 4 stars. Hotel 
prices for the REG are based on average prices listed at 
Expedia across hotel brands, star levels, and locations. 
Then during the survey, REG prices were at levels of 0.86, 
0.93, 1.15, and 1.3 times average prices. The last attribute 
of a REG hotel listing is the previous guest rating which 
has four levels: 3.5, 4, 4.5, and 4.8 (on 5-point scale).
Four attributes are used to describe an OPQ hotel listing. 
The first attribute is the star rating of the OPQ property 
which has four levels 3, 3½, 4, and 4½ stars. The second 
attribute of an OPQ hotel listing is the price discount (15%, 
25%, 35%, and 45%) off the average price of the corre-
sponding (i.e., same star level) REG hotel listing. Last, 
OPQ listing may or may not display previous guest review 
scores (attribute three), and if shown, the score can take one 
of four levels: 3.5, 4, 4.5, and 4.8 on a 5-point scale.
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The BID alternative is characterized by star level and 
price (or bid). The star levels of the BID option are from the 
same levels as the OPQ option (3, 3½, 4, or 4½ stars) but a 
choice scenario may display differing star levels across 
OPQ and BID (and REG), for example, a 3 star OPQ listing 
alongside a 4 star BID option. The second attribute of a BID 
hotel listing is the bidding price discount. To do a choice-
based experimental analysis, we do not allow respondents 
to enter their own bid offer on the screen. Instead, we show 
a price along with a winning probability to imitate the bid-
ding process. We facilitate this bid process in two manners: 
a traditional choice-based experiment with fixed levels and 
a menu-based choice experiment where users select their 
bids freely via a slider. We further elaborate on the bid 
prices and probabilities for the two experimental options in 
the following sections.
Traditional Experimental Choice
The BID option prices are at discounts of 45%, 55%, or 
65% of the corresponding average REG prices. BID dis-
counts are lower than OPQ listing as consumers not only 
deal with product uncertainty (similar to OPQ listings) 
they also have uncertainty around acquisition of capacity 
(will their bid be successful). BID prices also have an 
associated chance of winning (the third attribute), which is 
the possibility of getting the hotel room with the bid. 
Winning probabilities are set at either 95% or 50% chance 
of winning.
Menu Experimental Choice
Figure 1b shows a sample survey screen for the menu-based 
variant. The layout is the same as shown in Figure 1a except 
for the addition of the slider under the BID option. Under 
this form of the survey, respondents can move the slider to 
specify the bid/probability of winning combination at which 
they are interested purchasing via the opaque bidding 
format.
Our bid/probability experimental formats are based on 
input screens used by Priceline. Our traditional choice anal-
ysis format is based on Priceline’s bid guidance provided 
for rental cars as shown in Figure 2a. As illustrated in the 
figure, Priceline provides two recommended bids: one with 
a good chance (our 50%) and the other a great (our 95%) 
chance of being accepted. Whereas Figure 2b shows 
Priceline’s hotel bid price guidance slider upon which we 
base our menu bid/probability format.
We purchased a sample of 1,045 respondents through a 
survey sampling company. A total of 531 respondents com-
pleted the traditional format survey with 514 completing 
the menu-based choice experiment. Each respondent was 
shown 10 choice scenarios, and so we collected 10,450 
experimental observations. Table 2 summarizes the choice 
percentages for each of the alternatives for both survey for-
mats. Both survey formats show similar percentages with 
opaque channels being most attractive to consumers and 
consumers preferring the bidding option (BID) over posted 
opaque prices (OPQ) when given the flexibility in the 
menu-based survey. The choice experiment data were 
Figure 1.
Experimental Screen Layout: (a) Traditional Choice 
Scenario and (b) Menu Choice Scenario.
Table 1.
Attributes and Their Levels.
Alternative Attribute Levels
Full 
Information
Star rating 3, 3½, 4
Price multiplier 0.86, 0.93, 1.15, 1.3
Guest rating 3.5, 4, 4.5, 4.8
Partial 
Information
Star rating 3, 3½, 4, 4½
Price discount 45%, 35%, 25%, 15%
Guest rating shown, not shown
Guest rating if shown 3.5, 4, 4.5, 4.8
Partial 
Information 
With 
Bidding
Star rating 3, 3½, 4, 4½
Traditional  
 Price discount 65%, 55%, 45%
 Chance of winning 95%, 50%
Menu-based  
 Price discount 80% (100%), 70% (92%), 
65% (85%), 60% (80%), 
55% (75%), 50% (65%), 
45% (55%), 40% (40%), 
35% (20%)
 (Chance of winning)
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analyzed using maximum likelihood estimation via a MNL 
model as discussed in detail in the next section.
Model Specification, Estimation, and 
Analysis Results
In a discrete choice model, an individual decision maker 
(consumer) makes a choice among a feasible set of alterna-
tives. The decision is often made by maximizing random 
utilities of the alternatives. The MNL model is the most 
commonly used random utility model. For a greater detail 
in discrete choice modeling or the MNL model, please refer 
to Ben-Akiva and Lerman (1985). We provide a brief back-
ground into the MNL model to fully understand our novel 
approach to the estimation/calibration of the no-purchase 
utility which serves a critical role in how we estimate the 
incremental demand and revenue from opaque selling.
In an MNL model, we usually consider a universal set of 
alternatives denoted by C. The set of alternatives for con-
sumer n is denoted by C
n
 ∈ C. U
ni
 denotes the random util-
ity of alternative i for consumer n, which can be divided 
into two addictive components: U
ni
 = V
ni
 + ε
ni
, where, V
ni
 is 
the deterministic (representative) component. ε
ni
 is the ran-
dom component and ε
ni
 s are independent and identically 
Gumbel distributed.
Each alternative i in a choice set C
n
 is often characterized 
by a finite set of observable attributes x
ni1
, x
ni2
, …, x
nik
 in the 
following way:
 Vni
t
ni= β x ,  (1)
where x
ni
 = (x
ni1
, x
ni2
, …, x
nik
)t and β
i
 = (β
i1
, β
i2
, …, β
ik
)t are 
the vectors of unknown parameters that need to be 
estimated.
Every consumer is a utility maximizer, so the choice 
probability of alternative i ∈ C
n
 is given by
 
P i Pr U U all j C for n
e
e
e
e
n ni nj n
V
V
j C
ni
nj
n
i ni
nj
( ) [ ],= ≥ ∈ ∀
=
=
∈
′
′
∑
β
β
X
X
j Cn∈
∑
.
 (2)
We estimate the parameters β
i
 and obtain the choice 
probabilities by applying maximum likelihood method.
The corresponding likelihood function is:
 L P in
i Cn
M y
n
ni
= ( ) 
∈=
∏∏
1
,  (3)
where y
ni
 = 1, if consumer n chooses alternative i ∈ C
n
, = 
0 otherwise; M = the total number of observations 
(transactions).
In our MNL, the respondent makes a choice among the 
four alternatives in the choice set C = {REG, OPQ, BID, No 
Purchase}. The decision is made by maximizing random 
utilities of the alternatives.
The utility associated with the first three alternatives for 
respondent n is given by
 Uni i ni ni= ′ +β x ε ,  (4)
where i = 1, 2, 3 represents the alternatives REG, OPQ, and 
BID, respectively; x
ni
 are the vectors including attributes for 
alternative i and the characteristics of consumer n; β
i
 are the 
corresponding vectors of parameters to be estimated using 
the MNL model.
Figure 2.
Priceline Bidding Insight: (a) Rental Car Bidding and (b) Priceline App Bidding.
Table 2.
Market Share (%) by Alternative.
Alternative REG OPQ BID No Purchase
Traditional 15.16 25.57 30.72 28.55
Menu 14.40 26.81 33.48 25.31
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By Equation 2, the probability P
n
(i) respondent n chooses 
alternative i is given as the follows:
 
P i
e
e e
n
U
j
j
i
j
( ) =
+
′
′
=
=
∑
β
β
X
X
ni
nj 00
1
3
,
 
(5)
where i = 1, 2, 3 represents the alternatives REG, OPQ, and 
BID, respectively. U
00
 represents the utility of “No 
Purchase” choice. The “No Purchase” choice probability is
 
P
e
e e
U
U
j
j
j
00
1
3
00
00
=
+′
=
=
∑ β Xnj
.
 
(6)
Note that using an MNL model requires alternatives in 
the choice set to have the independence of Irrelevant 
Alternatives (IIA) property which holds that changes in the 
choice set do not affect the ratio of choice probabilities 
of any two alternatives. As one can see that in Equation 2, 
Σ
i ∈ Cn
 P
n
(i) = 1, the IIA property implies if some alternatives 
are removed or added from the choice set C
n
, the choice 
probabilities P
n
(i) will be proportionally revised so that they 
can still be summed up to be 1 (Ratliff, Rao, Narayan, & 
Yellepeddi, 2008). Specifically, in our situation, when we 
add either the OPQ hotel listing or the BID hotel listing (or 
both) to the REG hotel listing, we can compute the propor-
tionally shifted new choice probabilities of each alternative, 
allowing estimation of expected incremental revenue.
As one can see in Equations 5 and 6, we face the issue of 
properly estimating the utility of the “No Purchase” choice 
(U
00
). We assume that there are enough hotels in the market 
such that “No Purchase” consumers actually purchase either 
from other hotels (competitors) or this service provider’s 
offline distribution channels such as walk-ins and call cen-
ters. Under this assumption, analogous to Ratliff et al. 
(2008) which provides a recapture heuristic for estimating 
unconstrained demand from airline bookings, we estimate 
the no-purchase utility by using the actual market share of 
the three online distribution channel reported by STR 
(Smith Travel Research) Global in 2010. In the report, OTA 
market share is 4.6%, opaque OTA market share is 2%, and 
the hotel website has 17.5% market share. Assume that we 
know or can estimate our own market share from the his-
torical sales data and denote it by d. We can approximate the 
hotel’s demand on REG channel to be the sum of the OTA 
demand and the hotel’s website demand multiplied by d, as 
these two distribution channels both reveal full information 
including identity of the hotel. Opaque OTA demand is the 
estimate for demand of the two opaque listings. Hence, the 
three hotel listings’ market share is approximately MS
h
 = 
(4.6% + 17.5%)d + 2% = 22.1%d + 2%. Then the competi-
tors’ market share plus our own hotel’s offline market share 
is MS
c
 = 1 − MS
h
, and this is the simplified estimate of the 
likelihood of the “No Purchase” choice P
00
. Therefore, by 
substituting it into Equations 5 and 6, we get a simple esti-
mate for “No Purchase” utility U
00
 which can be solved 
from the equation below
 
e
MS
MS
e
MS
MS
e
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h j
j
h
h j
j
j nj
j nj
00
1
3
1
3
1
=
=
−
′
=
=
′
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=
∑
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Plugging Equation 7 and MS
c
 = 1 − MS
h
 back into 
Equation 5, we have the choice probabilities for all three 
alternatives i = 1, 2, 3 (REG, OPQ, BID, respectively) are 
given by the following:
 
P i MS
e
e
n h
j
j
j
i ni
i nj
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′
′
=
=
∑
β
β
X
X
1
3
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(8)
Model Estimation Results and Analysis
Table 3 presents parameter estimates for both survey for-
mats. In the following sections, we focus our discussion 
around using parameter estimates from the traditional 
choice-based results and later discuss the differences in 
parameters and the resulting impacts of traditional versus 
menu-based formats. As a simple check of model fit, we 
compare the log likelihood LL of the estimated model 
(−6761.517) versus that of a simplified model LL* with 
channel (BID, OPQ, REG) specific constants (−7995.938). 
To determine whether the estimated model is superior to its 
reference model, the −2(LL − LL*) value obtained is com-
pared with a chi-square statistic with degrees of freedom 
(20 in our model) equal to the difference in the number of 
parameters estimated for the two models (Hensher et al., 
2005) producing a p value of .000, as a result we reject the 
null hypothesis that the estimated model is no better than 
the reference model.
In the first section of the questionnaire, we asked which 
(if any) loyalty program(s) the respondent was a member 
of, and then conditioned the choice sets to include some 
options with their brand of choice, allowing estimation of 
Loyal to REG hotel during model fitting. This is a dummy 
variable coded as 1 if the REG alternative is from a hotel 
chain whose loyalty program that the respondent is affili-
ated to, 0 otherwise. Its positive coefficient estimate implies 
consumers who are in loyalty programs are more likely to 
choose the hotels from that brand (vs. other brands or 
independents).
The price variable for each channel is coded as a stan-
dardized continuous variable, that is, the difference between 
the actual price that the respondent saw and the average 
price across all price values shown on that channel divided 
by the standard deviation of all prices. Price coefficients are 
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all negative which shows that lower priced hotel rooms are 
always more attractive to consumers no matter where they 
are listed. Moreover, we can compute the price sensitivity 
for each channel which is the utility change induced by one 
dollar value of the price change, and the results are sum-
marized in Table 4 (note that we need to convert the stan-
dardized prices back to normal values). It appears consumers 
are more price sensitive toward opaque hotel listings than 
regular ones, that is quite intuitive and consistent with the 
empirical results in Granados et al. (2012).
By looking at coefficient estimates of hotel star vari-
ables, we can see that for REG listings, consumers prefer 
lower stars to higher, whereas for both OPQ and BID, 
hotels with higher stars are more popular than the ones 
with lower star ratings. These opaque findings are consis-
tent with Anderson and Xie (2012) who indicated 4 star 
hotels have the largest transaction share on Hotwire. 
Together these channel-star estimates imply that opaque 
consumers prefer the value trade-off of less expensive 
higher star hotels, whereas as full information consumers 
can not afford or choose not to purchase higher priced 
higher star classified hotels.
To test the impact of star level on price sensitivities 
across different channels, we included an interaction term, 
that is, the Star × Price variables in the MNL model. For 
example, for a 3 star hotel listed on REG, adding the coef-
ficients of price and Star × Price variables together and tak-
ing the absolute value, we obtain the new marginal utility 
for attribute price which is 0.8327. Similarly, we compute 
the new marginal utilities for price for other stars and chan-
nels, and list the results in Table 5. As one can see that for 
both REG and OPQ, lower stars are associated with higher 
Table 3.
MNL Parameter Estimation Results.
Variable Name
Traditional Menu
Parameter Estimate SE Parameter Estimate SE
Loyal to the REG hotel (REG) 0.8639*** 0.17 0.4129* 0.1899
REG constant −1.2362*** 0.3495 −0.9879** 0.3748
OPQ constant −0.454*** 0.1201 −0.5077*** 0.1031
BID constant 0.0935 0.0887 1.1005*** 0.0948
REG price −0.4034*** 0.0888 −0.4253*** 0.0913
OPQ price −0.6055*** 0.0868 −0.3677*** 0.0406
BID price −0.6799*** 0.0758 −2.1595*** 0.1273
REG 3 star 0.0875 0.141 −0.0947 0.1493
REG 3.5 star 0.0796 0.121 0.1017 0.13
OPQ 3 star 0.0475 0.158 0.1909* 0.0796
OPQ 3.5 star 0.0863 0.1275 −0.0034 0.1528
OPQ 4 star 0.1058 0.1178 0.2869* 0.1169
BID 3 star −0.0258 0.1522 −4.0342*** 0.2536
BID 3.5 star 0.0339 0.1111 −2.1241*** 0.167
BID 4 star 0.044 0.106 −0.8419*** 0.1244
REG 3 star × price −0.4293** 0.1449 −0.5468*** 0.1504
REG 3.5 star × price −0.2581* 0.1299 −0.2198 0.1274
OPQ 3 star × price −0.3577* 0.1606 −0.9828*** 0.1581
OPQ 3.5 star × price −0.2149 0.1382 −0.957*** 0.1266
OPQ 4 star × price −0.0751 0.1316 −0.4528*** 0.1171
BID 3 star × price 0.2818 0.1539 −2.3712*** 0.3031
BID 3.5 star × price 0.1233 0.1205 −0.9668*** 0.2407
BID 4 star × price 0.1296 0.1148 −0.7965*** 0.2091
REG guest rating 0.0845 0.0795 0.0798 0.0863
OPQ guest rating if shown 0.1672* 0.0738 0.3625*** 0.1086
OPQ (shown or no shown) −0.5448 0.3223 −0.6267 0.3482
Note. MNL = multinomial logit.
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
Table 4.
Price Sensitivity for Each Channel.
REG OPQ BID
Traditional 0.0049 0.0086 0.0144
Menu 0.0054 0.0051 0.0286
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Table 6.
Marginal Utility With Increasing Guest Rating.
Increasing 
Guest Rating
Marginal Utility %
REG OPQ
3.5 to 4 14.29 206.24
4 to 4.5 12.5 67.35
4.5 to 4.8 6.67 24.15
price sensitives, that is, when consumers see a lower star 
hotel listed on these two channels, they tend to put more 
weight of their choice on price variables. However, interest-
ingly, BID does not follow the same pattern as the other two 
channels, and price sensitivities rather fluctuate across the 
star ratings, which might be due to the connection between 
price and the probability of offers being accepted. For BID, 
consumers might choose a lower star hotel with a higher 
price but with a higher chance of winning over a higher star 
hotel with a lower price but with a lower chance of winning. 
Consumers are not only trading off stars and prices but also 
considering the chance of winning the bid, that is, the 
chance of getting the hotel room.
Prior guest rating or review scores impact OPQ options in 
two forms as they may (coded as 1) or may not (coded as 0) 
be present and then, if present, have differing scores. The 
marginal utility impact of the rating is then a combination of 
the shown dummy and the actual rating, that is, if the guest 
rating on OPQ is 3.5, then the value to the utility is 3.5 × 
0.1672 + (−0.5448) = 0.0404. This value is bigger than zero, 
that is, the value of the guest rating being not shown. This 
tells us showing guest rating attracts consumers more than 
not showing it. Similarly, we can compute the value added to 
the utility for guest rating being 4, which is 0.1242, and so 
the marginal increment percentage to the utility when guest 
rating increases from 3.5 to 4 given other attributes remain-
ing the same is (0.1242 − 0.0404) / 0.0404 = 206.24%. Table 6 
provides the marginal utility in percentages for both REG 
and OPQ alternatives indicating stronger impacts of ratings 
for opaque listings as compared with full information. The 
opaque consumer finds more utility (vs. the full information 
consumer) from user reviews as they considerably reduce 
the uncertainty in the option in the absence of typical 
information available at regular hotel listing. Interestingly, 
the marginal utility decreases with increasing ratings, indi-
cating that once the guest rating is high enough (e.g., ≥4), 
increasing guest rating will not have as large an impact on 
consumers choice as compared to with lower scores.
Differences Across Survey Formats
Table 3 summarizes parameter estimates from both survey 
formats with Figure 3 displaying a line plot of the coeffi-
cients for ease of comparison. As the table and figure indi-
cate for the most part parameter estimates are very similar 
(in scale and significance). What is clear from Table 3 is 
the increased price sensitivity when consumers are allowed 
more flexible choices during the experiment. Although 
numerous price-related parameter estimates are not sig-
nificant in the traditional experimental format, they 
become so in the menu format. This sensitivity is best 
shown in Table 4 where we summarize the price sensitiv-
ity across the three channels indicating that while REG 
and OPQ have similar sensitivities, the BID option is 
twice as price sensitive (for menu as compared with the 
traditional choice format) The increased price sensitivity 
of the BID channel resulting from more flexible price 
(bid) options impacts not only the BID channel but also 
the other two channels with the OPQ channel and REG 
channel showing small reductions in sensitivity. In the fol-
lowing section, we estimate the incremental revenue from 
opaque selling and highlight the impacts of this increased 
price sensitivity under the BID option.
Incremental Demand and Revenue From 
Opaque Booking Channels
Assume a hotel is currently selling via a traditional full 
information OTA and is looking to also sell via opaque 
OTAs. The REG, OPQ, and BID listings are priced at p
1
, p
2
, 
and p
3
, respectively. Let MS
h
 be the potential market share 
across these three channels, as discussed above, and with-
out loss of the generality, we assume the market is normal-
ized to be one customer, designated n. We also note that the 
hotel only gets a fraction of the demand for the opaque list-
ings presented by the choice probability from the MNL 
model (with the remaining going to other hotels listing via 
the opaque OTAs). This is because the opaque listings’ 
identities are concealed until after the purchase, and so the 
listing on opaque channels could be any hotel with the same 
characteristics within that area. We further can assume that 
this fraction is approximately just the hotel’s market share d 
introduced previously. Therefore, given the attributes of the 
three hotel listings and fraction of the demand for the 
opaque listings d, total demand for hotel from selling 
through REG, OPQ, and BID is D
1
 = P
n1
 + dP
n2
 + dP
n2
 with 
total expected revenue:
Table 5.
The New Marginal Utility for Price Attributes Across 
Different Channels.
Star Rating REG OPQ BID
3 0.8327 0.9632 0.3982
3.5 0.6615 0.8203 0.5567
4 0.4034 0.6806 0.5503
4.5 NA 0.6055 0.6799
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 pi1 1 1
2
3
= +
=
=
∑p P dp Pn j
j
j
nj ,  (9)
where P
nj
, j = 1, 2, 3 are given in Equation 8. If the hotel 
decides to only list a room on the regular full information 
channel, then by the IIA property mentioned previously, the 
choice probability for the REG alternative needs to be pro-
portionally adjusted so that the sum of it and the choice 
probability of the “No Purchase” alternative is still 1. Thus, 
we have
 ′ =
+
′
′P
e
e e
n U
n
n
1
1 1
1 1 00
β
β
X
X
,  (10)
where U
00
 is given in Equation 7. So the corresponding total 
expected revenue that the hotel can now obtain is
 pi2 1 1= ′p Pn ,  (11)
where ′Pn1  is given by Equation 10.
We now compute the hotel’s demand and revenue from 
selling through offline channels. Using the earlier discussed 
STR Global channel share estimates, the offline channel 
market share equals 1 minus online market shares or 75.9%. 
Hence, our hotel’s actual offline demand is 75.9% multi-
plied by our hotel’s market share d. Similar to the method of 
computing no-purchase utility, we use this actual offline 
demand to estimate the offline demand in the model. Recall 
the our hotel’s actual REG demand = (17.5% + 4.6%)d, and 
its estimate in the model is the choice probability of REG 
hotel listing, that is, P
n1
 given in Equation 8, so the offline 
demand in the model is D
off
 = actual offline demand × REG 
choice probability / actual REG demand = 75.9% × P
n1
 / 
22.1%. This implies that adding opaque listing will also 
dilute the offline channel demand. As usually the price of 
offline channels is the same as online channels (REG), so 
the offline revenue is denoted by π
off
 = D
off
 × p
1
. Therefore, 
adding opaque listings (OPQ and BID) to a REG listing 
gives a potential incremental demand of (P
n1
 + dP
n2
 + dP
n2
 
− ′Pn1 ) / ( ′Pn1  + Doff) and incremental revenue of (π1 − π2) / 
(π
2
 + π
off
). We use the following example to illustrate these 
calculations.
Consider a 4 star Hilton hotel selling rooms online 
through at traditional full information OTA. The hotel has a 
posted price of $349 (USD) and a guest review score of 4.0. 
The hotel is considering listing a posted price opaque chan-
nel at a price of 175 per room/night as well as accepting bids 
at an opaque OTA with bidding at a level of $140 per room/
night. The hotel’s current market share averages 10% (d = 
0.1). Using the equations above, the potential incremental 
demand from opaque selling is 5.87% and the corresponding 
incremental revenue is 2.23%. Incremental revenue is less 
than incremental demand as some original full information 
consumers switch to opaque channels resulting in price dilu-
tion but this dilution is more than offset by addition volume. 
Using typical hotel performance terminology, the hotel 
receives an increase in occupancy through a decrease in 
average selling price or average daily rate which combine 
together to create an increase in revenue per available room 
(if prices are set properly on opaque channels).
Table 7 displays the average incremental demand and 
revenue from adding both OPQ and BID listings to a REG 
listing as estimated using parameter estimates from the tra-
ditional choice experimental format. The averages are taken 
across all possible alternatives’ attributes (except for price) 
combinations for each BID and OPQ price pair ranging 
from 30% to 90% of the REG price.
Figure 3.
Comparison of Traditional Versus Menu-Based Parameter Estimates.
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Table 8.
Average Incremental Demand and Revenue (Shaded) From Adding Both OPQ and BID Listings to a REG Listing (%) 
via Menu base Choice Experiment.
Menu OPQ Price/REG Price
BID/REG 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
0.3 5.5 1.62 5.47 1.75 5.45 1.81 5.43 1.82 5.42 1.8 5.41 1.76 5.4 1.73
0.4 5.29 1.7 5.18 2 5.06 2.19 4.96 2.28 4.86 2.29 4.78 2.24 4.72 2.17
0.5 5.15 1.58 4.94 1.96 4.7 2.24 4.42 2.41 4.14 2.47 3.87 2.42 3.62 2.3
0.6 5.09 1.49 4.84 1.88 4.52 2.17 4.14 2.36 3.7 2.43 3.25 2.38 2.8 2.22
0.7 5.08 1.45 4.81 1.83 4.47 2.13 4.04 2.31 3.55 2.37 3.02 2.31 2.48 2.14
0.8 5.07 1.43 4.8 1.82 4.45 2.11 4.02 2.29 3.51 2.34 2.95 2.27 2.39 2.09
0.9 5.07 1.43 4.8 1.81 4.45 2.1 4.01 2.28 3.5 2.33 2.93 2.26 2.36 2.08
As displayed in the table, incremental demand and rev-
enue from adding opaque listings are positive across all dis-
count levels. The positive incremental values indicate that 
adding opaque listings to the existing regular listing enables 
a natural price discrimination and increased market seg-
mentation by reaching customers with different price sensi-
tivities or valuation of the products. However, appropriate 
prices need to be set on these three channels to balance the 
revenue gain from having extra opaque demand and the rev-
enue loss from diluting the revenue that we could have 
received from selling a full priced product through the regu-
lar channel. As seen in Table 7 that as prices of opaque list-
ings decrease, incremental demand is increasing as more 
customers are able to purchase (i.e., there is an option below 
their willingness to pay). However, incremental revenue is 
not strictly increasing as opaque prices decrease, but first 
increasing, and then decreasing as after a while incremental 
demand is insufficient to offset dilution.
Table 7 indicates that incremental revenue is highest at 
1.9% when the OPQ price is 70% and the BID price is 60% 
of the REG price. Table 8 shows similar incremental 
demand and revenue results obtained using parameter esti-
mates from the menu-based choice experiment. The menu-
based model indicates the optimal posted opaque price 
remains at 70% of regular posted prices, but owing to 
increased price sensitivity, the optimal opaque bidding 
prices reduces to 50% with a resulting increase of 2.47% in 
total revenue. It is interesting to note that current industry 
practice shows hotels using slightly lower prices with 
posted opaque prices around 50% to 60% and accepted 
opaque bids around 40% to 50% of regular prices. These 
lower prices in practice are probably a result of hotels com-
peting against each other for the opaque business versus set-
ting optimal opaque prices (vs. regular full information 
prices).
Summary and Managerial Insights
Selling through opaque posted channels (e.g., Hotwire.
com) or/and opaque bidding channels (e.g., Priceline.com) 
along with regular full information channels (e.g., Expedia.
com) provides the service provider an opportunity to seg-
ment consumers, expand the market, and increase total rev-
enue. On one hand, consumers who are less sensitive to 
prices and care to know the identity and location of the hotel 
will choose to book the room through the regular full infor-
mation channel. On the other hand, price sensitive consum-
ers who are not completely concerned about which hotel 
they stay exactly will yield to the option of trading the full 
information of the hotel for lower prices and book through 
Table 7.
Average Incremental Demand and Revenue (Shaded) From Adding Both OPQ and BID Listings to a REG Listing (%) 
via Traditional Choice Experiment.
Traditional OPQ Price/REG Price
BID/REG 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
0.3 4.65 1.24 4.47 1.42 4.3 1.51 4.15 1.53 4.02 1.49 3.92 1.43 3.83 1.35
0.4 4.52 1.33 4.3 1.55 4.07 1.68 3.87 1.73 3.69 1.72 3.53 1.66 3.41 1.58
0.5 4.42 1.35 4.15 1.61 3.87 1.77 3.61 1.85 3.37 1.85 3.16 1.80 2.99 1.72
0.6 4.34 1.33 4.03 1.60 3.71 1.79 3.40 1.88 3.10 1.90 2.84 1.86 2.62 1.77
0.7 4.28 1.29 3.94 1.57 3.58 1.76 3.23 1.86 2.89 1.89 2.58 1.85 2.31 1.77
0.8 4.23 1.25 3.88 1.53 3.49 1.72 3.1 1.82 2.72 1.85 2.37 1.81 2.07 1.72
0.9 4.2 1.2 3.83 1.48 3.42 1.67 3.01 1.77 2.6 1.79 2.22 1.74 1.89 1.65
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opaque channels. Therefore, adding opaque channels to an 
existing regular full information channel enables the service 
provider to capture more consumers without heavily dilut-
ing the revenue (i.e., simply lowering prices at Expedia). 
Although this advantage of implementing opaque selling 
has received considerable attention in the literature, this 
article is the first that is dedicated to evaluate consumer 
preferences among these three channels and show the 
potential incremental revenue increment from selling 
through multiple types of opaque channels. We implement 
an online choice experiment with choice scenarios showing 
the hotel listings on the three channels with varying degrees 
of product opacity and analyze the experimental data. We 
use an MNL choice model to study consumers’ preferences 
among channels and quantify the trade-offs consumers 
make during their hotel purchase decision.
We make contributions to the opaque selling literature 
and hotels in general across numerous fronts. From a hotel 
demand standpoint, as expected, purchase probabilities 
increase with decreasing prices but we illustrate that price 
sensitivity increases with increasing channel opacity. 
Similarly, while controlling for price, lower star classified 
hotels (vs. higher classified hotels) are more attractive to 
consumers on full information channels, the opposite is true 
for opaque channels with consumers preferring higher star 
hotels. Last, while guest reviews have a positive impact 
upon purchase decisions, this impact is amplified for opaque 
versus full information listings. Together these three find-
ings illustrate that consumers are actively engaging in value 
seeking on opaque channels, they are very price sensitive 
and seek higher star hotels with better review scores in an 
effort to offset some of the uncertainty in not knowing the 
hotel they are purchasing until after the room is fully prepaid 
in advance. In addition to quantifying customer preferences 
across purchase channels, our MNL framework allows us to 
evaluate incremental revenue from opaque selling. Our 
incremental demand and revenue estimates provide reason-
able and generalizable insights as we calibrate our choice 
model no-purchase probability using representative channel 
shares for domestic U.S. hotels. We find that both demand 
and revenue gains are achieved by adding opaque listings to 
the regular listing as the service provider is able to reach 
more customers with heterogeneous price sensitivities. 
However, the service provider needs to set appropriate prices 
across opaque and full information channels as deeply dis-
counted opaque prices result in elevated levels of dilution 
but measurable discounts are required for consumers to 
overcome the uncertainty in opaque channels. We find that 
optimal incremental revenues are achieved with opaque 
posted prices at 70% and opaque bidding prices at about 
60% of regular full information prices, slightly higher that 
prices we see in practice indicating that firms while growing 
demand with deeply discounted opaque prices may doing so 
at the cost of incremental revenues.
As discussed earlier, our article makes several contribu-
tions to the literature as we empirically assess the simulta-
neous use of posted opaque selling, opaque bidding in 
concert with transparent or full information selling. We per-
form this comparison in a hotel setting which given its 
larger degree of product differentiation (vs. airlines) runs 
more risk of demand dilution through opaque selling. We 
show that even in the face of potential dilution, there exists 
as set of prices across opaque (bidding thresholds for 
opaque bidding) and transparent channels that maximize 
firm revenue. Our insights are for firms without capacity 
constraints, and we would expect opaque prices (and thresh-
olds) to approach transparent prices as demand approached 
capacity. Last, we illustrate some of the pitfalls of tradi-
tional choice experiments as we show slight changes in 
product attributes and channel choice under the more flexi-
ble structure of menu-based choice analysis.
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